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A central feature of the Asian currency crisis was the vast prior capital inflow into 
the region, and the later rapid reversal of that movement. In seeking to explain why 
this outflow of capital took place and was so devastating for the countries concerned, 
various writers have laid blame upon a combination of connected lending, poor bank 
supervision, moral hazard and “crony capitalism”. 
 
Our emphasis is different. Much of the capital inflow financed a vast over-expansion 
of commercial real estate development.  Plunging real estate values accompanied by 
severe difficulties in the banking and financial sector have been common occurrences 
across the region. The argument is that large international portfolio capital flows 
mediated by banks will usually lead to rapidly appreciating asset prices which will 
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1. Introduction 
Table 1 shows the extent of capital inflows into Asian economies prior to the crash. 
In 1996, the inflow of capital into the IMF-3 (Thailand, Indonesia and Korea) 
averaged nearly 7 per cent of GDP.  Associated with the inflow of capital was a trend 
to current account deficits (CAD’s), and by 1996 Hong Kong SAR, Korea, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were in this position (see Table 2). A third related 
feature was that much of the inflow financed a vast over-expansion of commercial 
real estate development. Rapid reversal of the movement of capital and plunging real 
estate values have been common across the region, as have severe difficulties in the 
banking and financial sector. 
Other factors undoubtedly played a part in the Asian crisis.1 Paul Krugman (1998a) 
takes the view that the currency instability was symptomatic of bad loans which 
result from the expectation that insolvent banks will be bailed out by the taxpayer. 
Later he gave a prominent role to “crony capitalism” under which “dubious 
investments were cheerfully funded by local banks, as long as the borrowers had the 
right government connections” (Krugman, 1998b). However, banking and currency 
crises are not new, and occurred long before there was any public support for the 
banking system. One such episode took place in Australia in the 1890s, when the 
ingredients were much the same as in Asia recently – heavy overseas borrowings, 
vast real estate speculation and a banking crash (54 out of 64 banks and 35 out of 36 
finance houses were forced to close).
2 
 
Our argument is that, even without banking support arrangements and “crony 
capitalism”, large international portfolio capital flows intermediated by banks will 
usually lead to rapidly appreciating asset prices which will result in banking/currency 
crises. This is because portfolio investment will push the currency up to relatively 
high and unsustainable levels, and the boom in asset prices which is fuelled by bank 
lending must result in bad loans on the part of those “left last on the field”. This in 
turn will lead to a joint loss of confidence in both the currency and those financial 
institutions. 
The paper falls into two parts. One considers various forms of foreign investment 
(FI) and their impact on the exchange rate. Our purpose is to identify those capital 
flows which impose either small or large adjustment costs on the host country, and 
those capital flows which lead to exchange rate changes which are either more or less 
rationally based. The second part focuses on the question of real estate speculation. 
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2.  When does FI create adjustment problems? 
 
What patterns of foreign investment (F1) push the real exchange rate up to levels 
which makes the domestic economy vulnerable to adjustment costs and changes in 
investor sentiment? Second, what patterns of foreign investment (FI) are likely to 
trigger an abrupt reversal in that sentiment?  These are the questions examined. 
In the general case, capital inflow leads to a mixture of increased domestic spending 
and real exchange rate appreciation for the host country, which induces a 
corresponding increase in its CAD/trade deficit and resource transfer from abroad. In 
an economy producing traded and non traded goods, this real appreciation involves a 
rise in the relative price of non traded goods, leading to a fall in the production of 
traded goods and an increase in their consumption, both of these substitution effects 
increasing the CAD. 
When this foreign capital flow ceases or reverses, these mechanisms are then thrown 
into reverse. In effect, the debtor country has traded present current account deficits 
for future surpluses, and such surpluses can be generated in one (or more) of three 
ways. The first is that in the course of the deficit/borrowing process sufficient new 
export or import-replacing capacity is created to facilitate the future flow of real 
transfers. The second way in which transfer may be effected is through adjustment in 
the exchange rate, and the debtor country pays a penalty in the form of a higher real 
cost of imports and lower real wages. The third way is to ‘squeeze’ the required 
surplus out of the economy by ‘disabsorption’; that is, by restricting domestic 
consumption of resources until a trade surplus of sufficient size is generated. 
If the real exchange rate/real wages/relative price of non traded goods can be reduced 
to an appropriate level, a smooth adjustment can be made with GDP being 
maintained by a combination of increased competitiveness (which switches domestic 
spending toward home production) and reduced domestic spending (which avoids the 
demand inflation associated with this switching). However, if relative prices are 
“sticky”, the reduction in the trade deficit requires a decrease in domestic spending 
alone, and likely involves unemployment and business bankruptcies. Furthermore, 
unexpected nominal depreciation means that unhedged debtors or banks must also 
bear the additional burden of the increased cost of servicing loans denominated in 
foreign currency (a feature of the Asian currency crisis). For these reasons, there is 
some value in identifying those forms of FI which significantly push up the real 
exchange rate. 
2.1   The traded good content of FI 
An obvious starting point is the import/traded good content of FI expenditures. At 
one extreme, FI requires no real appreciation because the import/traded good content 
of the FI expenditures is unity. For example, a foreign owned car maker may 
increase the productivity of its existing local plant by installing imported machinery 
or by using foreign personnel to train local workers. In this case, the FI leads directly 
to a resource transfer – robots or skills – and no change in the real exchange rate is 
required to introduce it. It follows that when this FI is completed there is no need for 
an indirect reduction in domestic spending nor any need for a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. The real exchange rate and the host country are not required to adjust  
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to either the capital inflow nor to its cessation. It is hard to imagine such a pattern of 
FI leading to a “currency/banking crisis”; it is rationally based, banks may not be 
involved, and the capital inflow has had no short run currency impact, even though it 
might have raised the ratio of CAD to GDP, the conventional “early warning” 
indicator of currency crisis. 
At the other extreme, the import/traded good content of FI may be zero, as in the 
case of basic building construction. Then domestic labour is required to construct the 
non traded “bricks and mortar” which are financed by the FI. At full employment 
there has to be some real appreciation to increase the CAD commensurately with the 
capital inflow to induce labour to switch from producing traded goods to 
construction. Where the increased demand for labour by FI is met by immigration 
from rural areas (as in some developing countries) or from overseas (such as “guest 
workers”), houses and infrastructure may have to be constructed for those taking the 
jobs created by the FI, and any increase in the demand for and price of land can very 
easily initiate a surge of borrowing and lending to take advantage of anticipated 
further price appreciation. 
We now have a potential transfer problem in adjusting to the reduction in capital 
inflow: the real exchange rate must fall to allow all of these construction workers to 
find jobs back in the traded goods sector (alternatively, there will be unemployment 
caused by lower spending). In this world we should expect investors to monitor the 
size of the CAD when framing their expectations of the future course of the 
exchange rate. The higher the levels of FI and the CAD at full employment, the 
greater must be the real devaluation to accommodate zero levels of FI and CAD. 
Although it would not be surprising to see the currency fall with a reduction in the 
rate of capital inflow, it would be unusual for a significant capital outflow and 
“currency crisis” to develop. This is because the mechanism is well understood and 
quite transparent to informed investors. Likewise, an unforeseen decline in the terms 
of trade of any country always creates an “overvalued” exchange rate, but there 
seems no reason in theory or practice why this decline in itself should lead to a crisis. 
On the other hand, these changes may provoke a currency crisis if the operations of 
the major financial institutions in the economy and the actions of foreign investors 
themselves have not been rationally based – being predicated, for example, on the 
assumption of perpetually constant or rising terms of trade or capital inflows. 
Assumptions of this kind are implied whenever investors describe any economy as 
“miraculous”. When they cease to believe in “the miracle”, there is every reason to 
repatriate capital on a grand scale, since the original motivation has evaporated. 
2.2  The direct expenditure content of FI – portfolio vs direct investment. 
The statistician’s definition of “foreign direct investment” (FDI) is that foreigners are 
buying a controlling interest in an existing or a new domestically based enterprise. 
However, this definition of FDI is not helpful to understanding the impact of FI on 
the exchange market. This is because the impact on the foreign exchange market of 
foreign purchases of existing domestic assets is not affected by whether or not a 
controlling interest in those assets is involved. 
To avoid this confusion, we would prefer to distinguish portfolio foreign investment 
(PFI) – the sale of existing assets (equity, debt or cash securities) to foreigners, 
whether or not a controlling interest is involved – from “true” foreign direct  
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investment (TFDI) – the establishment by foreigners of a new enterprise or the 
extension of an existing enterprise which is engaged in producing goods or services 
with intrinsic value – that is, a value which is independent of capital inflow or the 
existence of any current investment “fad” such as a boom in the prices for equities 
and real estate. 
By definition, PFI is a portfolio transaction, even though it may be on a grand or 
controlling scale. As such, it does not directly lead to any increase in domestic 
spending required to effect the resource transfer just described, at least until domestic 
spending rises. By contrast, TFDI immediately raises domestic spending and leads to 
a lesser real appreciation. 
In judging whether or not asset prices and the exchange rate are sustainable at the 
levels to which they have been inflated by PFI, rational investors will not be looking 
at the CAD, which is not directly affected by the PFI and may in fact be zero or 
negative. Rather, those involved in buying host country assets will be looking at the 
prospective rate of return, in domestic currency, on the assets they have been buying. 
In the case of a FI driven “boom” in host country asset markets, this return will 
depend on the expected rate of future capital inflow. In turn, the inflow will be 
influenced by the stock of foreign claims resulting from earlier PFI relative to the 
ability of the economy to meet those claims from potential GDP. If PFI has failed to 
create net productive investment expenditures, and a net rise in potential GDP, it is 
creating an inevitable crisis of confidence in the currency and in the financial 
institutions which are mediating FI flows and domestic asset purchases. 
In the case of PFI which debt-finances the domestic purchase of domestic assets, 
these claims will be growing at something like the rate of new PFI plus the rate of 
interest payable on existing debt. In the case of equity financed PFI, foreign claims 
will be growing at the rate of PFI plus the rate of appreciation in the prices of the 
assets to which PFI has been attracted: if domestic land prices are doubling each 
year, and foreigners own some domestic land, existing foreign claims on GDP will 
be doubling annually. In both cases, but more particularly the second, this growth 
will be even more rapid if there is a “feedback” mechanism operating between the 
rate of asset price appreciation and the rate of PFI itself. 
A similar but less extreme outcome occurs with TFDI when it causes physical capital 
to be constructed in areas which are already “overdone” in the sense that the gross 
rate of return on capital, while positive, has been pushed down to levels which are 
low relative to interest rates and foreign rates of return
3, so that the increase in 
potential GDP is relatively small. Presumably this “irrational” pattern of investment 
can persist for a time for a number of reasons such as investor inertia imposed by 
“follow the leader” practices, the prospect of continued rises in the prices of the real 
assets being constructed, and private and public investors gaining prestige from 
“building the world’s tallest” (albeit half empty), whether it be in Shanghai or Kuala 
Lumpur. 
Where these privately unprofitable projects have been financed by foreign equity, the 
implications for exchange rate stability are relatively minor in that the flow of TFDI 
is unlikely to be sustained, so that the exchange rate/expenditure must simply fall to a 
level reflecting lower capital inflow. On the other hand, where these projects are debt 
financed, there must be a capital outflow equal to the previous inflow inflated by 
interest commitments, so that the exchange rate/expenditure must fall by  
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considerably more. In addition, the inevitable collapse of a debt financed boom in 
asset prices inevitably threatens the viability of all the financial intermediaries 
involved, because it is axiomatic that those borrowers who are last to purchase at 
inflated prices make losses and become bad loans. 
In this account, the relevant indicator for an impending currency crisis is not the 
CAD (a flow) but rather the stock of foreign claims. As one commentator said: 
“What triggered my interest that all was not well in Asia was that the wall of funds 
coming from the West should have accelerated economic growth but this did not 
happen. When we noticed higher growth was not happening, we started to watch two 
things: [the utilisation rate of capital in manufacturing and commercial property].”
4 
It is also noteworthy that in the recent Asian experience, the CAD/GDP ratio had 
exceeded 5 per cent  - Lawrence Summers’ “litmus test” (his fifth lesson from the 
Mexican crisis of 1994) – only in the case of Thailand and Malaysia (see Table 2). 
But Summers did add the rider that ”particular scrutiny is needed if increases in 
capital inflows are not matched by increases in investment in traded goods sectors”. 
(Summers, 1995). 
2.3  FI and domestic consumption. 
FI may be indirectly stimulating domestic consumption. If so, foreign saving is being 
substituted for domestic saving. In extreme cases these consumption effects may be 
strong enough for potential GDP to be lower than it would be without the FI: the 
inflow of foreign saving leads to a rise in productive investment which is less than 
the decline in domestic saving. In this case, the stock of foreign claims is increasing 
in line with FI, while the ability of the economy to meet those claims from GDP may 
be constant.
5  
There are many mechanisms by which PFI can stimulate domestic consumption. 
These include increased domestic liquidity, asset prices, and perceptions of private 
wealth, and greater domestic private and public confidence or “euphoria”, all 
resulting from foreign purchases of existing financial and real assets. Especially 
significant in this context is that urban growth associated with TFDI may stimulate 
domestic consumption by inflating prices for urban land and property. These rising 
asset prices will normally attract domestic and foreign speculators both of which 
generate domestic credit creation: the demand for credit rises to take advantage of 
expected increase in asset prices, and the supply of credit rises because borrowers 
offer the perception of greater security over those assets. This rise in asset prices 
creates an illusion of greater private wealth which stimulates private consumption. 
Through these mechanisms the inflow of foreign saving indirectly replaces domestic 
saving. 
Less obviously, confidence in the current exchange rate is also threatened when the 
flow of FI is heavily biased towards financing a profitable boom in residential 
construction or other facilities producing non traded goods and services. In this case, 
both the buildings and the residential services which they provide are non traded 
goods which cannot be used directly to service (through the transfer of real 
resources) the debt or equity provided by foreigners. Consequently, a real 
devaluation is required to shift resources into the production of traded goods with 
which to effect a resource transfer in favour of foreign claimants of interest and 
profit. When investors judge that such a resource shift is required, the exchange rate  
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will be perceived as over-valued. This process need not lead to a capital flight and 
currency crisis, only a downward adjustment, because the mechanism is transparent 
and the movement of funds is rationally based. However, the authorities may resist 
the adjustment and cling to fixed parities, presenting speculators with a “one-way 
bet”. 
3.    Why emphasise real estate speculation? 
3.1    The special features of property investment 
Why single out property investment for special treatment? In terms of providing the 
goods and services necessary for a country to service, and ultimately repay, its 
foreign debt, an office building does little, at least directly, to augment exports or 
import replacement capacity (although it may be part of a production process for a 
tradeable financial, engineering or management service). Also, unlike many other 
forms of real investment, a property investment is largely irreversible: an office 
building is highly location-specific and cannot be shifted should excess capacity for 
office space emerge locally, whereas “machinery” can be shifted from one place to 
another. However, over-investment in highly traded and transportable products such 
as automobiles and semi-conductors may be no more worthwhile than over-capacity 
in commercial real estate. 
There are some other distinctive features of commercial real estate. One is its 
longevity, and a feature of property development is a long delay between order and 
completions. A typical project might take three years between planning and disposal 
stage. By the time the development comes into fruition, economic conditions 
generally and the specific factors which have prompted the project may have altered 
markedly, while the long term character of many property investments and their high 
gearing ratios make them sensitive to changes in interest rates and credit conditions 
brought by any change in the rate of capital inflow. 
The long delay which elapses between planning and completion interacts with a 
stock of property which is specific to both location and use. This combination of 
fluctuations in demand for property with an inelastic short run, but elastic long run, 
supply creates the conditions for a classic “hog cycle” whereby the market alternates 
between famine and glut. The long delay before user-demands for space can be 
translated into additional stock sustains space shortages, leading to rising rentals and 
property values. These rising prices induce developers into new construction. But in 
the short run, the effects on demand and supply can even be perverse. Potential 
tenants may acquire properties ahead of time in anticipation of rising rents, while the 
increase in property prices enables property traders to increase their borrowings and 
purchase more property. Eventually, the supply of new property responds to 
changing user and investment demands, but perhaps in a very different economic 
climate, producing an excess supply of space and depressing property prices in a 
manner only too apparent in many Asian cities today. 
There is thus a user and an investment market in property. Property can be acquired 
for investment purposes as well as for use, with expectations of rental growth driving 
up asset prices and lowering yields. The property market is thus one manifestation of 
“asset price inflation”, and certain property assets may bear more relation to 
movements in other “investor” assets such as equities than to other property types, 
and like the equity market may exhibit “bandwaggon” effects and price “bubbles”.  
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Developers who “follow the lead” may misread a sharp rise in rents as a permanent 
increase. This is particularly so if there are distortions in pricing introduced by risky 
traders, perhaps along the lines of the “looting” model of Akerlof and Romer (1993). 
Of course, many of the problems we have associated with capital inflow and real 
estate speculation – exchange rate appreciation, asset price bubbles, euphoria, 
consumption effects, excess space and failed investment projects relate also to 
speculation in equity markets. Nevertheless, there remain some important 
differences. Prices of shares can be measured and the changes in price compared 
through time, but this is more difficult to do in the case of property, because the 
product “property” is remarkably heterogeneous, reflecting both the unique features 
of each property and the diverse nature of property rights. Shares are bought and sold 
whenever markets are open but the markets for many properties are thin. The 
heterogeneity of property and the complexity of the legal rights to its use and re-sale 
make for illiquidity, especially in the market for secondary property. 
If, as we have argued, property is difficult to value, sensitive to market conditions, 
strongly cyclical and prone to speculative bubbles, what accounts for its “fatal 
attraction” and link to external capital flows and currency instability? The answer is 
two-fold. Real estate speculation is to some degree inherent in the urban and 
economic growth process which usually accompanies and induces capital inflows. At 
the same time, real estate plays a special role in banks’ portfolios. 
3.2  Property’s fatal attraction 
The special role of property in bank assets results from the belief that real property 
offers sound collateral – a belief which leads banks to routinely lend 70 to 80 
per cent  (or more) of valuation, compared with only about 50 per cent for equities. 
This feature in turn has two effects. First, with a boom in PFI mediated by banks, it 
magnifies the increase in real estate asset prices relative to equity prices. Second, it 
increases the vulnerability of banks and the currency to a property crash. 
This second effect is itself magnified by the interdependence between the banks’ 
expected value of real estate collateral and the anticipated property income (either 
rentals or capitalised rentals) which is being relied on for loan repayment. Should 
this expected income stream fail to materialise, as it must when there is global over-
financing and over-construction, the collateral turns out to be illusory and banks may 
fail. 
The attraction of commercial property to banks rests on a false analogy with other 
forms of secured lending. Use of bricks and mortar as collateral has an obvious 
appeal in that borrowers cannot give good title to property without banks giving 
consent. And it may be said that banks’ lending to property companies is much like a 
lot of other bank lending which is also secured against land and buildings. Yet there 
are important differences. 
When a bank makes a housing loan, secured against residential property, the 
borrower’s ability to repay the loan is based on a cash flow from employment 
income which is often largely independent of the value of the collateral, which then 
serves an insurance function as a back up in case things go wrong. The same is true 
of most industrial and commercial lending, where conditions in the borrower’s 
industry market, triggering the loan default, may be quite different from those in the 
collateral markets governing the ultimate recovery rates on the loan. With  
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commercial real estate loans, by contrast, the borrower’s ability to repay the loan is 
highly correlated with the value of the collateral either because the property is 
acquired for re-sale or because increased vacancy rates and reduced rentals are 
quickly reflected in the price of the property and hence the value of the collateral. 
This interdependence between the value of collateral and the anticipated income 
stream which is earmarked for loan repayment is also present in the case of equities 
where profits from the resale of equities, as opposed to dividends, are being relied on 
for loan repayment. Yet when bankers make loans for the purchase of equities 
intended for resale at a profit, it is clear to them that they are engaged in high risk 
lending in anticipation of rising equity prices. On the other hand, lending to an 
individual property developer permits a high degree of self-deception about the level 
of risk involved. This perhaps explains why the banking system habitually over 
extends itself in lending for property development. 
3.3  Banks and the Asian property cycle 
A strong association between real estate cycles and bank instability is not new.  This 
particular nexus was central to banking problems in a large number of countries in 
Western Europe and elsewhere in the early 1990s (Lewis, 1994).  Capital flows add 
an extra dimension to the Asian case.  However, capital flows, property and bank 
crashes have featured in Australian bank crashes and property crises, in both the 
1890s and the 1990s.  What remains distinctive about Asia is the number of countries 
involved and the conjunction of events within a short space of time. 
Asian development has been synonomous with strong export-led growth.  Exchange 
rate difficulties for the S.E. Asian countries began with the Chinese devaluation of 
January 1994 and was exacerbated after April 1995 when the US dollar (to which the 
countries’ exchange rates were closely tied) began to appreciate in world markets.  
The result was an export slowdown which proved to be a catalyst for the subsequent 
crisis, as strong growth in the region became increasingly dependent on domestic 
demand rather than net exports.  Countries became focused on rapid development of 
the infrastructure in terms of public sector projects (bridges, roads, airports), real 
estate developments (offices, shopping plazas, hotels, luxury apartments and houses), 
and expanding capacity in the industrial sector (cars, steel, chemicals and computer 
chips), fuelled by inflows of foreign capital. 
In the property market, the result was a vast increase in office building, which has 
meant that Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur now have much more prime office space then 
either Hong Kong or Singapore (see Table 3).  Inevitably, the expansion in supply 
and the ‘hog cycle’ had its effect.  Figure 1 shows prime office capital values in 
Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong and Singapore from 1983-1998.   
Figure 2 gives the movement of net prime office rentals in the same cities.  Both 
figures show that rentals and office values were on a downward trend long before the 
crisis began in July 1997, with the floating and dramatic fall in value of the Thai 
baht.  Shares of property companies in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia declined 
sharply after 1994 and continued to fall well before the stock market as a whole 
collapsed.  Speculation against the Thai baht, which led to the currency problems, 
was itself precipitated by the crash of a finance company with a heavy involvement 
in the property market.  
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But not only finance houses were attracted to the property sector.  Tables 4 and 5 
show both that private capital inflows fuelled an expansion of bank credit in the 
Asian economies generally, and that a significant portion of the bank lending flowed 
to the property market. Some details on bank lending in Hong Kong, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines are provided in Table 4. 
In most of these economies, bank assets account for over three-quarters of total 
financial sector assets, and over the years 1990-1997 (with the exception of Hong 
Kong) bank credit grew much faster than GDP (which averaged about 8 per cent per 
annum). In Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, property lending 
represented between 25-40 per cent of total lending, and an even higher percentage 
of the total in Hong Kong. Most of this exposure was to the commercial property 
sector, and in four of the countries, the loan-to-valuation ratios applied on these loans 
ranged from 80-100 per cent. (In Hong Kong, the authorities reduced the acceptable 
loan-to-value ratio from 80-90 per cent in 1990 to 60-70 per cent by 1993.)  Non-
performing loans, already high in some countries before the crash, increased sharply. 
At the same time, the dominance of commercial bank lending in mediating capital 
flows to Asia in the 1990s is illustrated by Table 5 which shows that, for five Asian 
countries, commercial bank lending accounted for between 57-60 per cent of total 
private capital inflow between 1994 and 1996.  In one of these countries – Indonesia 
– by 1997, 77 per cent of private sector foreign debt was owed to foreign banks 
(predominantly Japanese), most of it short term. The overwhelming amount – also 77 
per cent  - was owed by non-bank entities. And as if to close the circle, roughly the 
same percentage (nearly 80 per cent) of this non-bank corporate debt was in foreign 
currencies and unhedged, leaving the entities severely exposed when the currencies 
fell.6 
 
4. Policy  Implications 
Clearly, the bankruptcy, unemployment and general impoverishment associated with 
the dramatic reversal of foreign investor confidence in the currencies of South East 
Asia have been disastrous for the region.  Some, for example Davidson (1997), 
blame foreign currency speculators for such events, and have renewed calls for 
measures to reduce the international mobility of finance through some form of 
‘Tobin tax’ or controls on international capital movements. While other analysts 
agree that some policy management of capital inflows is appropriate, they tend to 
restrict the range of policy choice to monetary policy (sterilisation of capital 
inflows), fiscal policy, and exchange rate policy, for example Calvo, Leiderman and 
Reinhart (1996). These authors also view as appropriate bank regulation which 
“limit(s) the exposure of banks to volatility in equity and real estate markets, as well 
as (establishing) risk based capital requirements”. In short, the story has been: round 
up the usual suspects. 
For reasons given above – and we believe them to be very strong ones – our focus 
has been on the interconnections linking capital flows and the real estate market. 
There are five parties to an asset price boom which is driven by FI: foreign investors; 
foreign banks; domestic banks; domestic investors; and the domestic authorities. In 
an ideal world, one would look to the domestic urban planning authorities and the 
Central Bank to regulate the domestic land market and the financing of speculative 
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real estate transactions in order to prevent the excesses of a land and property boom. 
Although there will be inevitable distortions, such a boom is easily prevented by the 
threat of public intervention in the land market. More broadly, there could be 
controls on capital inflows into domestic land markets, with the foreign purchase of 
domestic land actively discouraged by taxation or prohibited for reasons given by 
Easton (1988) and Brander (1989). While such controls might in many cases be 
evaded, the costs of evasion would have a dampening effect. 
But in a society of “crony capitalists” one would expect domestic politicians and 
domestic banks to encourage and to be personally and deeply involved in any real 
estate boom. So one would look to “non cronies” – such as international banks and 
finance companies – who ‘feed” funds to domestic banks to limit their own 
involvement, both in their own interests and in the interests of domestic and global 
stability. 
Unfortunately, there is ample evidence that, even in economies where transparency 
could be expected to prevail, this moderation is not always present. Earlier 
experience of the involvement of banks of many domiciles in the property cycle over 
the 70s and 80s shows that the collective mechanisms (syndication and the interbank 
market) on which bankers rely actually facilitates their risk-taking which causes them 
to succumb to the temptation to suspend customary prudential standards in an 
environment in which the endless growth psyche has taken hold. 
The only way that this can be avoided is for banks continually to observe a set of 
standards against which to evaluate their risk taking behaviour. In the context of 
international capital flows this means:7 avoiding an undue concentration of loans to 
single activities like construction: likewise, avoiding undue exposure to a group of 
currencies, recognising that it is an illusion to diversify between countries and 
currencies for which the terms of trade and image in the eyes of foreign investors are 
highly correlated; ensuring that the collateral is not vulnerable to the same shocks 
that weaken the borrower; never following a herd instinct; and recognising that there 
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Notes: 
1.  There are now a large number of accounts of the crisis, particularly on the 
Internet. The IMF’s authoritative version of events is in IMF (1998). A recent 
article  which emphasises asset prices is Browne, Hellerstein, and Little 
(1998). 
2.  The episode is examined in Cannon (1966) and Butlin (1961). 
3.  An example is the rental yield on office buildings which in June 1997 prior to 
the onset of the crisis had fallen as low as 3.5 per cent in Hong Kong and 3.9 
per cent in Singapore (J.P. Morgan, Asian Financial Markets, January 1998.) 
4.  Peter Brain, of a leading Australian research institute, reported in The 
Australian, February 6, 1998. 
5.  Again, there are historical precedents for this in Australia where there is 
evidence that Victorian saving reached negative levels at the peak of the 
1880’s boom (Bentick, 1969). 
6.  However, the position in Indonesia was symptomatic of the position 
elsewhere.   In 1996, Malaysia had 85 per cent of debt in foreign currencies, 
Thailand had 80 per cent in foreign currencies (World Bank, 1998). 
7.  These echo the ‘golden rules’ which one of the authors outlined in an earlier 
paper (Lewis, 1998). 
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TABLE 1 
 
CAPITAL FLOWS TO ASIAN ECONOMIES 







1995 1996 1997 
China  1.2  2.5  5.2 4.7 3.7 
Indonesia  1.5 4.2  6.2 6.3 1.6 
Korea  -1.1  2.1  3.9 4.9 2.8 
Malaysia  3.1  8.8  8.8 9.6 4.7 
Philippines  -2.0 2.7  4.6 9.8 0.5 
Singapore 5.0  3.8  1.3  -10.1  -5.5 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
0.2  -4.0  -3.6 -3.2 -3.8 
Thailand  3.1    10.2  12.7  9.3 -10.9 
 
 
Source:  IMF  
TABLE 2 
 
SELECTED ECONOMIES: CURRENT ACCOUNT POSITIONS 
(AS PER CENT OF GDP) 
 
  Average  
  1991-1995 1996  1997  1998  1999ƒ 
        
United  States  -1.2  -1.8 -1.9 -2.8 -3.3 
Japan  2.6  1.4 2.2 3.6 4.0 
European  Union  0.3  1.1 1.5 1.2 1.1 
        
China  0.7  0.9 3.9 3.4 3.3 
Hong Kong SAR  3.6  -1.1  -3.2  -0.4  1.2 
Taiwan  P.O.C. 3.6  4.0 2.7 2.0 2.2 
        
Singapore  12.8  15.7 15.4 20.6 18.9 
        
Korea -1.5  -4.7  -1.8  12.9  7.9 
Indonesia -2.4  -3.3  -1.8  2.5  2.7 
Malaysia -7.0  -4.9  -4.8  6.3  4.6 
Philippines  -3.7  -4.7 -5.2 -1.5 -0.7 
Thailand -6.4  -7.9  -2.0  10.7  9.9 
        
Australia  -4.1  -4.0 -3.2 -5.0 -5.4 




Source: IMF, National Statistical Sources  




OFFICE VACANCY RATES AND AVAILABLE SPACE IN SELECTED ASIAN CITIES. 
 
 Vacancy  Rates
1 Stock
2 New  Supply3 
  1997 1998 1998 1999-2001 
Bangkok 23.6  29.7 0.87  59.6% 
Jakarta 8.9  22.1  2.84  4.7% 
Kuala 
Lumpur 
3.7 15.5 3.26  9.4% 
Hong Kong  6.4  16.6  1.91  5.6% 
Singapore 8.0 12.3 1.52  15.0% 




1  Vacancy rate is the percentage of the total office floor space unoccupied at end of 
period. 
2  Total office floor space in millions of square metres. 
3  New supply is confirmed space for projects on which construction has commenced 
and projects which have been agreed contractually, expressed as per cent of the 
existing stock of office floor space. 
 
 
Source: Jones Lang La Salle. 
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TABLE 4 
BANK LENDING AND RISK EXPOSURES IN SELECTED ASIAN ECONOMIES. 
 
  
























































n.a.             8  157    40-55   (9)     50- 70         1.5  3 
Thailand  75  18  105    30-40  (8)  80-100  15.0  25.0 
Malaysia  78  16  95    30-40 (14)  80-100         7.5  15.0 
Singapore  71  12  97    30-40 (15)     70- 90         2.0         3.5 
Indonesia  91  18  57    25-30  (4)  80-100       11.0  20.0 
Korea  39  12  64    15-25 (13)  80-100  16.0   22.5 
Philippines  n.a.  18  52    15-20 (n.a.)     70-  90  5.5  7.0 
 




       Composition of private capital flows to five Asian economies,
 
                                        1994-1999 





  1994 1995 1996 1997  1998ƒ 1999ƒ 
Foreign direct 
investment 
4.7 4.9 5.8 6.5 6.9 7.4 
Portfolio equity 
investment 
7.4 11.0 11.6 -6.8  1.1 -0.9 
Commercial bank 
lending 
23.4  58.0  58.3 -29.0 -30.5 -17.8 
Bond financing  2.4  9.9  18.1  23.3  -2.1  -3.8 
Total 37.9  83.8  93.8  -6.0  -24.6  -15.1 
 
1  Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
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